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ABSTRACT: South Africa is often regarded to be at the forefront of water reform, based on Integrated Water 
Resources Management (IWRM) ideas. This paper explores how the idea of IWRM emerged in South Africa, its key 
debates and interpretations and how it has been translated. It maps out the history, main events, key people, and 
implementation efforts through a combination of reviews of available documents and in-depth semi-structured 
interviews with key actors. While South Africa sought to draw on experiences from abroad when drawing up its 
new legislation towards the end of the 1990s, the seeds of IWRM were already present since the 1970s. What 
emerges is a picture of multiple efforts to get IWRM to 'work' in the South African context, but these efforts failed 
to take sufficient account of the South African history of deep structural inequalities, the legacy of the hydraulic 
mission, and the slowness of water reallocation to redress past injustices. The emphasis on institutional structures 
being aligned with hydrological boundaries has formed a major part of how IWRM has been interpreted and 
conceptualised, and it has turned out to become a protracted power struggle reflecting the tensions between 
centralised and decentralised management. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) has been the dominant water management 
paradigm since the 1990s emerging out of the recognition of the dysfunctions of sectoral approaches to 
water management (GWP, 2000; Jonker, 2007; Molle, 2008). Still, as argued by the authors in this 
Special Issue there is a lot of ambiguity around what IWRM actually is and how it should be interpreted 
and practised (cf. Mehta et al., this issue). It is a 'boundary concept' (Gieryn, 1999), as it offers 
something for everyone. How does such an influential idea emerge and get a foothold? How does it 
continue to hold sway over people in widely different geographical and political contexts? Tracing the 
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emergence and spread of IWRM is as much an exercise in the history of ideas as it is in understanding 
trends in water management (see Mehta et al., this issue, Allouche, this issue). 
This paper explores how the idea of IWRM emerged in South Africa, the key debates and 
interpretations and how it has been translated. It maps out the history, main events, key people, and 
implementation efforts. South Africa was in the vanguard of water policy and practice in the 1990s and 
underwent its own reform of the water sector as part of the wider political changes after 1994. Its 
constitution was one of the first to recognise the human right to water and food (RSA, 1996: section 27 
(b); Gleick, 1998). The translation of the constitution into water policy was executed by key South 
African thinkers, drawing on the advice and expertise of international experts. South Africa holds a 
unique position in African and global water management for a variety of reasons. These include its size, 
progressive constitution and water policies, the nature of inequality, interactions of race, class and 
historical legacies, and also institutional reform processes such as decentralisation and catchment 
management agencies. These reasons coupled with the fact that the National Water Act of 1998 as well 
as the 1997 White Paper not only wholeheartedly embrace an IWRM approach (see also Denby et al., 
this issue) but are some of the most progressive water policies in the world, making South Africa an 
interesting case to explore in IWRM terms. 
While there have been many papers written about IWRM in South Africa (e.g. Jonker, 2007; Funke et 
al., 2007; Goldin et al., 2008) most of them tend to be case studies looking at specific localities, or 
analysing particular dimensions of IWRM. This paper, in contrast, seeks to understand the life of the 
idea of IWRM at different sites and scales in the country. The main question that we explore is how 
(and by whom) IWRM was brought in and conceptualised in the South African policy, legislation and 
implementation? In particular, we focus on the main debates around catchment management, and how 
these have been translated into practice. These questions were addressed by studying the actors and 
key policy events that were associated with the introduction of IWRM in South Africa. This involves 
mapping the existing literature on the subject, including grey material and unpublished documents, and 
doing in-depth interviews with key people who have played active roles in the process of propagating 
IWRM in South Africa. A particular emphasis is placed on understanding the institutional ramifications 
of IWRM, and how the ideas have targeted the institutional landscape that forms the backbone of 
South African water management. 
HOW IWRM EMERGED IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE 1998 NATIONAL WATER ACT FOUNDATIONS 
In order to appreciate South Africa’s water governance, it is necessary to understand its unique position 
in historical and political economy terms. South Africa has had a multiplicity of governance forms 
through the course of its history – tribal kingdoms, the Dutch East India Company, the British Empire, 
the Union of South Africa, and the apartheid and post-apartheid republics, representing the whole 
gamut from authoritarian, semi-authoritarian and democratic state forms. Over time, water policy, law 
and institutions came to reflect the increasingly complex needs of multiple actors represented by 
different political regimes. A common feature has been the central role of the state (Swatuk, 2008). 
The Union State played a particularly important role in terms of investing in large-scale 
infrastructure development to boost white agriculture in what was the South African version of the 
'hydraulic mission'. The needs of urban areas and mines were mainly catered to through the financial 
investments of the mining houses, or self-financed by local municipalities, mainly targeted towards 
white communities, while neglecting the needs of the black majority (Turton and Henwood, 2002; 
Turton et al., 2004; Schreiner and Hassan, 2011). Interbasin transfers were an integral part of the 
hydraulic mission, but the ecological and social implications of such schemes have not been sufficiently 
addressed (Snaddon et al., 1998; Gupta and van der Zaag, 2008; see also Movik et al., this issue). What 
the hydraulic mission represented was an effort at gaining control over the water resources, a control 
that was vested in the hands of the white minority, leaving the black population with no control at all. 
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This is reflected in the distribution of water use, as registered in the Water Authorisation and 
Registration Management System database. In rural areas, 1.2% of the people use 95% of the water. 
The other 98.8%, most of whom depend on agriculture-based livelihoods, access only 5% of the water. 
This corresponds to a Gini coefficient of 0.99 (Cullis and van Koppen, 2008). 
In addition to the investments in water infrastructure engineering, there was the grand-scale social 
engineering experiment set in motion, accelerated by the National Party once it came to power in 1948, 
to create a country neatly divided into segregated 'homelands' for the indigenous populations in order 
to foster what was euphemistically termed 'segregated development' (Terreblanche, 2002). The process 
of creating such homelands meant uprooting more than 3.5 million people, forcibly splitting up families 
and clans and resettling them in marginal areas with poor soils (Platzy and Walker, 1985; Levin and 
Weiner, 1997). The apartheid era efforts at carving up the country according to skin hues, ethnicity and 
race are still visible in modern day South Africa. The former homelands are very much part of the 
landscape – for example, in the area where the former homeland of KaNgwane used to be, now part of 
Mpumalanga, cattle grids mark subtle boundaries between former homeland territories and 
commercial farmlands. Despite post-1994 efforts to get rid of homeland legacies, systems established 
during colonialism and apartheid have not been done away with (King, 2005). People are still residing in 
overcrowded areas as a result of a staggeringly skewed land distribution. As Hall (2004: 219) notes, "the 
extent of land dispossession in colonial and apartheid South Africa dwarfs that of other southern 
African states". Inequitable land access also inevitably shapes access to water – in the Olifants Basin, for 
instance, 95% of the water was in the hands of white farmers and miners (Cullis and van Koppen, 2007). 
The 1956 Water Act was associated with a patchwork of institutional, legal and regulatory 
arrangements emanating from the Act and its many amendments. A central tenet was the riparian 
doctrine – i.e. that water rights were appurtenant to owning land along a river – while groundwater 
was considered private property. Under the Apartheid regime, the homelands were supposed to 
become self-governing states, but only four accepted self-governance. Only one, Bophuthatswana, had 
its own water law. In the other homelands the republic’s law was still valid. 
Late in the 1960s, the Apartheid Government became increasingly concerned about water scarcity 
and pollution and a Commission of Enquiry into Water Matters was set up to address the issues. In 
1970, the Commission Report was published, introducing a range of ideas that resembled the later 
concept of IWRM. It recognised water pricing, the environment as an important user in its own right, 
and launched the concept of wastewater discharges to mitigate pollution from industries and mines, 
and also promoted the idea of 'catchment committees'. Moreover, there were permits for forestry and 
arrangements to compensate for negatively affected downstream water users (van Koppen and 
Schreiner, 2014). 
After a couple of decades of political turbulence, the early 1990s offered a more optimistic outlook, 
and in 1994 came the major transition from the apartheid republic to a democratic state. The country 
went from being an isolationist siege economy to a nonracial democracy and a global world player 
(Terreblanche, 2002). The political transition warranted a new water law to translate the new 
constitution in the water field. This also opened up space for reform that had been initiated by the 
Apartheid government. The policy networks that formed around the time of the drafting process were 
characterised by a set of strong personalities. Kader Asmal was a powerful figure, who emphasised the 
human rights aspect of water, fittingly enough with a background as a human rights lawyer. The White 
Paper of 1997 set out the principles of the water reform (RSA, 1997). In 1997, the Water Services Act 
was passed, followed a year later by the 1998 National Water Act (NWA). As there were major political 
reforms taking place at the same time as the water reform process was unfolding, there was a critical 
mass in terms of redrawing the maps and doing a systematic institutional design exercise, including 
bringing to life the IWRM idea of basin institutions. But it also meant major overhauls of the 
government administration, with the rolling out of new local municipalities to replace the old structures 
of apartheid. It was going to take some time before the local municipalities would be able to shoulder 
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their new responsibilities. In the meantime, therefore, the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
(DWAF) was given the responsibility of tackling backlogs in domestic water supplies until local 
government structures were fully operational (Eales, 2011). 
The drafting of the Act was done by a team of South Africans, led by Minister Kader Asmal, with 
extensive public participation. A number of international experts were also invited to share their 
experiences with water reform, from FAO and countries like Zimbabwe, Australia, Namibia, the US, 
Finland (as donor), the UK, France and other European countries, New Zealand and Mexico. However, 
donor influence was not considered to be massive, as expressed by a water specialist working in a 
donor agency in Pretoria: "I would struggle to think that IWRM is externally imposed in South Africa; in 
other African countries where water ministries were set up by donors about 15 years ago, that may be 
the case; but not in South Africa" (Interview, April 2014). 
In terms of creating the new legislation, water professionals across the world considered South 
Africa to be ahead of the game in many respects, particularly relating to the human right to adequate 
drinking water as enshrined in the Constitution, and the concept of the 'Reserve'. The Reserve basically 
entailed setting aside a certain amount of water in-stream, in order to be able to meet basic human and 
ecological needs. This further expanded on the notion of environmental needs that were already on the 
agenda in the 1970s Commission Report. Some environmentalists thought that if you take care of the 
environment, including wetlands and biodiversity, this would also help alleviate poverty.1 The influence 
of the environmentalists in the drafting process remained so strong that some argue that the NWA was 
'hijacked' by environmentalists (De Coning, 2006; Movik, 2012; Muller, 2014). The National Water Act 
also shifted to a nationwide licensing system for new water uptake, while recognising the apartheid 
era’s highly unequal Existing Lawful Uses as continuing to be lawful until a process of area-wide 
compulsory licensing was complete. 
A key aspect of the NWA was the emphasis on redressing past inequalities. It was recognised that 
the NWA itself did not provide sufficient detail on how to go about achieving a more equitable 
distribution, and hence the Water Allocation Reform (WAR) process was set in motion in 2003, resulting 
in the publication of the WAR position paper in 2006, which was later revised in 2008. However, very 
little progress has been made with respect to reallocation, due both to political and technical issues, 
and the emergence of particular 'allocation discourses' which emphasised the risks of redistribution 
(see Movik, 2012). 
These trends need to be seen in the context of larger political changes and ideological struggles. 
From the early post-1994 days, South Africa’s water sector was caught in an ideological struggle with 
respect to rights-based approaches embedded in the Reconstruction and Development Policy (RDP). 
Dealing with the backlog in water services formed a key component of the RDP, while in all other 
domains cost-recovery aims prevailed in line with the institutional recommendations of development 
banks and some donors. This has been a contested issue plaguing the water sector, and compromising 
issues of access to water (Mehta and Ntshona, 2004; Eales, 2011; Dugard, 2012). The African National 
Congress (ANC) governing party since 1994, underwent a radical change from a socialist development 
discourse to a neoliberal consensus; from growth through redistribution and meeting basic needs, to 
redistribution through growth achieved through neoliberal expert orientation (Peet, 2007). The Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy was a strategy that endorsed liberalism and deregulation, 
and by implication a scaled-down role for the State (Villa-Vicencio and Ngesi, 2003). In particular, the 
deregulation of the agricultural sector meant that there was a shift towards more high-value 
commercial crops, which according to Hall (2004) served to increase the gap between 'winners' and 
'losers'. 
                                                          
1
 Interview with member of water law drafting team, 22
 
April 2013. 
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Another phenomenon that unfolded during this period was the veritable 'brain drain' from a number 
of departments. The Department of Water Affairs and Forestry lost many of its most experienced and 
senior staff, who chose to start afresh in the consultancy sector rather than stay with a job they found 
increasingly frustrating.2 
INTERPRETATIONS OF IWRM: DEBATING WHAT SHOULD BE INTEGRATED AND HOW? 
Having thus set the scene in terms of the South African water governance context, we now move on to 
look at the idea of IWRM in more detail and how it was interpreted in different settings and at different 
levels. In 1997, a workshop was organised to present case studies and lessons from other countries, 
including Mexico, France, Australia, Britain, Malaysia, India and Zimbabwe. Australia constituted an 
important source of influence during the drafting of the National Water Act, as it was argued that it was 
very similar to South Africa in geophysical terms. According to one member of the drafting team, the 
model of Catchment Management Agencies (CMA) was drawn from Australia.3 While the term IWRM is 
not mentioned explicitly in the NWA itself, the ideas associated with IWRM are clearly present. 
Our whole National Water Act is, as far as I’m concerned, about IWRM. It is all about local institutions and 
getting people involved and it is also about balancing environment, social and development aspects of 
water. All this is IWRM. Biswas and others say that IWRM is not workable in South Africa. But it is no 
blueprint. It should be interpreted as best practice and something to work towards. We can take what suits 
us in South Africa; it comes from our White Paper, from Rio and from South African democracy (Interview 
with water department official, July 2013). 
However, how IWRM should be interpreted was clearly a matter of debate. The Water Research 
Commission, which is an important knowledge hub on water governance in South Africa, saw itself as 
playing a key role in shaping the understanding of IWRM. The Commission was established in 1971 and 
is South Africa’s major think tank on national water issues and has initiated numerous research projects 
with IWRM as the main theme. According to several informants within the Water Research Commission 
(WRC), it was the WRC that brought IWRM to South Africa early in the 1990s.4 
IWRM was en vogue internationally then – it was intellectually appealing to many of us in South Africa who 
were agonising and debating about similar issues. We had a charismatic Minister and a progressive 
government then and having outsiders endorse new policies etc. which boded well for the time. 
Progressive South African thinkers thought this was the best practice of the time (Interview with WRC, July 
2013). 
Early on, officials and the people at the WRC spent a lot of time debating and trying to define what 
IWRM was. It started off with Integrated Catchment Management (ICM), and then this evolved into 
Integrated Water Resources Management. However, it was unclear what was meant by 'integration'. 
For instance, one issue was whether or not water resources and water services should be integrated, 
which did not occur. The operational elements of water services were ring-fenced into a separate Act. 
This in turn gave rise to an institutional set-up that separated the water services aspect from the water 
resources, where Europe pushed the IWRM bit, and America and the World Bank pushed the water 
services sector. The fact that two Acts were created was influenced by the then Director-General’s 
opinions on the distinction that needed to be made between water in pipes and water as a resource. He 
referred to the Constitution, which makes this distinction. However, there was no consensus with 
respect to such a division, and some people argued that there was "no proper integration which is what 
                                                          
2
 Personal communication with water consultant, 17 July 2013.  
3
 Interview with WRC (Water Research Commission), 10 August 2006. 
4
 Interview with WRC, 16 July 2013. 
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IWRM calls for" (Interview, June 2013). The related institutional mandates were debated as well. One 
key informant argued that the department did not have the capacity to implement water services. 
Moreover, the ANC wanted to bring the government closer to the people, and hence the responsibility 
for service delivery was vested in local governments. The problem with local governments is that they 
are often quite cash-strapped and lacking in capacity. Provincial governments are supposed to deal with 
noncompliance regarding service delivery but "they have no clue" (Interview with water official in 
Pretoria, June 2013). DWA cannot implement directly because the national government cannot 
normally intervene locally. Another issue relating to integration was the initial lack of coordination 
between the land and water reforms, which meant that the debates about integration within the water 
realm, and in particular water allocation, did not link up to the political processes playing out with 
respect to land reform (Movik, 2012: 120; see also Denby, 2013; Denby et al., this issue). 
The first National Water Resources Strategy (NWRS), which was published in 2004, draws on the 
Global Water Partnership (GWP) definition of IWRM and states the importance of linking domestic 
water use/needs, sanitation and health issues to IWRM. The necessity of integrating local planning 
instruments, such as the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) with water supply and sanitation services is 
also underscored by Pollard and Du Toit (2008). 
Even though our Water Act is all-encompassing, we have these two separate legislations (…) there was 
always a discussion in terms of IWRM, with respect to the separation into resources and services – there 
was a white paper for resources, and a separate one for water supply, which I think was too 
compartmentalised (…). There were research reports written on 'how to integrate', and the perennial 
question was – what are we trying to integrate, is it vertical, is it horizontal – what would perfect 
integration look like? (Interview with WRC, July 2013). 
According to the WRC informants, when the principle of IWRM was 'sort of established', it seemed a 
little bit too idealistic – in the sense that it did not really acknowledge the context. For instance, in 
South Africa the whole system is based on interbasin transfers, there are some 375 interbasin schemes 
across the country, and if half of the water is transported out of the basin in seven of the nine 
provinces, the question arises – what then is left to deal with? Because the South African system is so 
complex, it makes trying to adopt IWRM principles very complex too. Basically, it is an engineered 
system that one wants to transform into a people-centric basin management system. Still, as one of the 
interviewees said, "in the beginning it was so clear, it was just so clear that with the subsidiarity 
principle (…) you have layers of authority; you had a clear comprehensive picture of what the landscape 
would look like" (Interview, July 2013), adding that this was probably naïve. An important point was 
that the CMAs needed enough revenue and autonomy to do their job. The challenge consisted of 
figuring out the layers of hydrological boundaries and administrative boundaries, which were largely 
translated in planning instruments such as the Integrated Development Plans created bottom-up by the 
municipalities. Implementing IWRM was first and foremost a concern with getting the institutional set-
up right.5  
Parallel with the focus on services, environmental concerns were a key issue on the agenda as well. 
One adviser to the water law review team pointed out that research in the Kruger National Park in the 
1970s raised concerns over the fact that the perennial Sabie River was drying up, and an emerging issue 
was how to deal with this. The idea of creating environmental rights surfaced already at an early stage 
as well.6 The emphasis on determining what the Ecological Reserve should be in each basin was a major 
contributor to the licensing and the process of Water Allocation Reform (Movik, 2012), as it is so 
difficult to determine what it should be and close to impossible to monitor (Bourblanc, 2015). 
                                                          
5
 Interview with WRC, 17 July 2013 
6
 Interview with water law drafting team adviser, 22 April 2014. 
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These diverse understandings and implications of IWRM are reflected in the following quote: 
IWRM makes sure that decision making integrates services and management issues, i.e. demand side and 
also how to deal with growing water services and delivery. It also highlights the need to 'value' the 
resource and conserve. It helps to go against silo thinking and facilitates joint planning. Of course, it is a 
mantra like gender. But whether departments actually work together and integrate is another matter. I 
would hate to dismiss it totally but not sure it is actually happening (Interview, April 2014). 
While the WRC’s understanding of IWRM seemed to follow the conventional ideas around basin 
management and grappling with the question of institutional integration at the national and regional 
levels, another version of IWRM was pursued by a donor-initiated 'pilot' exercise led by Danida. As part 
of a five-country pilot project on IWRM, it launched a project in three provinces in South Africa in 2000, 
the Crocodile West-Marico in the Northwest Province, the Mvoti to Mzimkulu in KwaZulu-Natal and the 
Olifants-Doorn in the Western Cape Province. The basic idea of the Danida IWRM pilot projects was an 
interpretation of IWRM as being about participatory bottom-up water management; about local 
people’s access to water for livelihoods. Hence, the projects focused on small-scale water users – 
farmers and other small nonagricultural users – in the three regions. The programme was run in 
partnership with the Department of Water Affairs (DWA), the South African Local Government 
Association (SALGA) and aimed to support the creation of CMAs in the regions. The project used donor 
funds to 'do things differently rather than to do more of the same'. The focus was on poverty reduction 
and on using IWRM to achieve the MDGs. However, the approach was controversial. One of the people 
who had been involved in the project talked about how Danida’s strategies in the first five-six years 
tended to focus on IWRM strategies at the national level, which he called 'paper stuff'. He felt it was too 
vague, and that one needed to take IWRM 'to the ground' and to try to help people with real water 
problems in their villages, which is what Danida then did. The idea was to address local people’s water 
needs holistically without separating domestic and irrigation needs, which is conventionally the case. 
The project also sought to consider both the social and economic factors involved, assess whatever 
infrastructure was needed, and undertake the necessary steps and include everything related to water. 
That, essentially, was taking a bottom-up holistic approach. The main desire was to leave the national-
level strategies and get to the real problems, whilst still acknowledging the need for strategies as such. 
A similar 'livelihoods-based' approach to IWRM was pursued by a research programme organised by 
WaterNet,7 in cooperation with UNESCO-Delft and the Consultative Group of International Research 
(CGIAR) Challenge Program on Water and Food in the Olifants catchment in South Africa. It focused on 
improving rural livelihoods and interpreting 'integration' to mean better integration of 'green' and 'blue' 
water, and arguing for a "new IWRM-based water governance from village to basin scale" (Love et al., 
2004: 1). The idea was to develop guidelines for catchment management and scale it up to a needs-
based IWRM framework for sustainable water for food development at the basin scale. Though the 
approach is a bottom-up, needs-based and livelihoods-centred one, the idea of the 'basin scale' is still 
very much present there as well. 
Indeed, the idea of basin-scale management emerges as a central feature in the South African 
discourse on IWRM. The concept of Catchment Management Agencies (CMAs) is seen to provide an 
arena for stakeholder participation and negotiations. Anderson (2005) outlines ways in which 
historically disadvantaged individuals can be engaged in CMA planning processes, using the Inkomati 
Water Management Area as a case study. She argues that "a key criterion for successful IWRM should 
be the degree to which the approach empowers disadvantaged and marginalised communities" 
(Anderson, 2005: 1). She highlights the challenges of legitimate representation, accessibility, 
                                                          
7
 Southern African regional network for academic capacity building on IWRM. WaterNet established a node in Western Cape 
University and, from 2009 onwards, a chair in IWRM. Two of the yearly symposia were held in South Africa (see Movik et al., 
this issue for a detailed analysis of WaterNet). 
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information/communication and the challenges of arriving at a shared consensus in a context of power 
imbalances. Pollard and Du Toit (2011) pick up on the latter issue, highlighting the challenges inherent 
in having a diverse array of stakeholders, to arrive at a shared vision of how water will be used in a 
specific hydrological region. They argue for the usefulness of what they call 'mental models' in order to 
overcome the differences in understandings and meanings among stakeholders in a context of ongoing 
power struggles. 
CREATING INSTITUTIONS ACCORDING TO HYDROLOGICAL BOUNDARIES 
Problems with creating CMAs 
A key feature of the National Water Act was the idea of creating new institutions, CMAs, based on 
hydrological boundaries, referred to as Water Management Areas (WMA) in South Africa. The NWA 
states that all water resources need to be managed in an integrated manner, and where appropriate, 
management functions should be decentralised and delegated to the regional or catchment level to 
enable stakeholder participation. Section 73(4) of the NWA states that "the Minister must promote the 
management of water resources at the catchment management level by assigning powers and duties to 
catchment management agencies when it is desirable to do so" (RSA, 1998: 8). This structure was seen 
as quasi-federal by some commentators (Simeon and Murray, 2009) whereas others would describe it 
as 'co-operative government' (Constitutional Court, cited in Muller, 2014). 
The notion of hydrological boundaries and catchments was present in the 1970 Commission report, 
but these ideas were mainly used as a basis for developing infrastructure to transfer water out of the 
basin, rather than for the purpose of governing water resources in accordance with basin boundaries 
per se. So, even though the idea was not entirely new, the concept of CMAs created much confusion, as 
well as uncertainty about the intentions of DWA among water users (Jonker et al., 2010). There was a 
lot of thinking, and it was also a case of looking at the viability of all the originally proposed 19 CMAs in 
terms of revenues. With respect to the widespread practice of interbasin transfers and how to deal with 
this from a catchment perspective, the recipient catchment would have to pay the water management 
charge to the donor catchment.8 
A Water Law Review Task Team was set up, and for CMA proponents within this team, IWRM was a 
fortunate, internationally prestigious principle to invoke for making their case. IWRM as a term was 
profusely used in the task team’s discussion documents. Integrated Catchment Management was seen 
as a key element of IWRM, and it should be further developed as an approach (van Koppen and 
Schreiner, 2014).9 The task team also considered devolution of central responsibilities to the provincial 
and local governments that were being established, but rejected this option as they were 'political'. 
Moreover, the argument was that they lacked constitutional powers and experience. Interventions 
during the negotiations of a new Constitution made sure that political federalisation of river 
management did not happen, as it would have involved the allocation of water resource functions to 
sub-sovereign levels (Muller, 2014). The approach to river management in subsequent legislation also 
avoided introducing 'basin federalism', the allocation of powers and functions to administrative units 
based on basin boundaries. The CMAs in the new South Africa were to serve a double role of upward 
and downward accountability. In 1999, after the 1998 NWA had come into force, the Department 
established a new directorate, called 'Catchment Management', and later Water Management 
Institutions Governance, which subsequently became the Chief Directorate for Institutional Oversight 
with five members of staff. The idea was to support and guide the process of establishing CMAs. A CMA 
                                                          
8 Interview with WRC, 16 July 2013. 
9
 See link for details of approach: http://inkomaticma.co.za/publications/icma-documents.html  
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task team was put together, and given the mandate to produce guidelines and tools in order to guide 
the setting up of CMAs in the Water Management Areas. In spite of seeing CMAs as adhering to the 
subsidiarity principle of management at the lowest appropriate level, CMAs retain a strong upward 
accountability to the Minister, conforming to the national mandate and the need to coordinate the 
extensive infrastructure networks which run across provincial, basin, and national boundaries. The 
initial functions of CMAs prescribed in section 80 of the NWA are light: to investigate and advise in 
water use; to develop a Catchment Management Strategy; to coordinate the related activities of water 
users and of the water management institutions; to promote the coordination of its Catchment 
Management Strategy implementation with the implementation of any applicable development plan 
established in terms of the Water Services Act, 1997; and to promote community participation in water 
use. When CMAs 'mature', the Minister can delegate or assign more functions, in particular licensing 
and planning and also allocating responsibilities for the funding, development, operation and 
maintenance of catchment-level water resources infrastructure either by other institutions or directly. 
Members of the Regional DWAF staff were expected to be transferred to CMAs. From the outset, 
the major differences between the country’s catchments were appreciated, including the fact that less 
wealthy areas would not be able to establish a fully self-financed CMA, based on water use charges. The 
resource intensity of CMAs was recognised, but no specific state funding was negotiated. "CMAs were 
to focus on the most problematic and conflict-ridden catchments facing water scarcity and pollution, 
where government cannot solve the issues alone" (Interview, July 2013). 
Particularly, environmentalists found an appreciated opportunity to approach water resources as 
integrated eco-habitats within the (assumed) proper hydrological boundaries of a catchment (WMA). 
Integration for consensus seeking would be across vertical layers, as well as water protection, 
development and utilisations, and land uses. In terms of promoting equity, other than ensuring 
equitable and demographic participation and board representation, redress was not an explicit goal and 
it was not further operationalised. There was a realisation that attempting to reallocate water within 
the framework of a CMA would be too politically sensitive. The task team members realised that CMAs 
based on partnership and consensus seeking would not be adequate for water allocation decisions in 
South Africa at that point in time. 
One of the staff members employed in the Institutional Oversight unit recounted the early 
experiences with rolling out the CMAs, stating that the first four or five years were spent intensely 
focused on policies and guidelines, and "when looking back, I see that we were incredibly naïve" 
(Interview, August 2013). Further, he stated that: 
What was intriguing, was that in the early days it was the 'tail wagging the dog', some of the people in the 
regions started to work on proposals while we were still trying to get the guidelines in place. It was a 
bizarre moment when they were running ahead of us (Interview, August 2013). 
The same staff member in the Institutional Oversight Department felt that the main reason that two 
CMAs had actually been established by 2015 – the Inkomati (in 2004) and the Breede-Overberg (in 
2005) – is the tenacity of champions in the regions. There was generally a lot of resistance from the 
regions; many people did not see the point in establishing CMAs, and areas such as the Free State, the 
North-West Province and Gauteng were not very cooperative. The Eastern Cape was coming around to 
the idea. At the time, the Directorate staff thought "this was just something that the regions had to do, 
that we would develop the guidelines and then they would set about doing it. But like I said, we were 
incredibly naïve" (Interview, August 2013), and the Directorate staff did not appreciate the fact that 
there were going to be power struggles in the regions; they just thought that the regions would be 
supportive; that they would get on with it; and thus did not really engage with those discussions. There 
was a belief that the processes would take care of themselves. In hindsight, it is clear that much more 
preparatory work was necessary. These observations conform to what Funke et al. (2007) observed, 
that, while IWRM was official policy, it had yet to be 'officially' accepted in practice. 
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In the participatory processes leading up to the establishment of the CMAs, deep power imbalances 
persisted, in combination with a lack of decisiveness that negatively affected the processes. There were 
power struggles both among stakeholders and within the bureaucracy responsible for implementation, 
and eventually a paralysis in setting up the CMAs (see Denby et al., this issue for a detailed analysis of 
the Inkomati experience). An issue was that "you are basically asking staff from the government public 
sector to join a parastatal with the associated resistance and instability".10 And regardless of whether 
the CMAs happened or not, they would still receive their bonus, which prompted the question of "how 
can you regulate someone whose salary is three times your own?". Then there is the decentralisation 
discussion that we are having now. If we decentralise, we are probably getting an even more skewed 
society.11 CMAs would be liable to be captured by local interest groups. By contrast, Water Boards 
could maintain a national voice and would not get captured by local issues/interests to the same 
extent.12 
There was a change of leadership in the directorate in charge of institutional oversight and then the whole 
process of institutional realignment began. The task team worked closely together, but in the new 
director’s opinion, the team was way beyond what it could do and there were simply too many institutions. 
From a pragmatic point of view, it was understandable that there was a need to reduce the number of 
CMAs. However, the current set-up was very logical from a governance point of view. When he (the new 
director) said 'it is not about governance, but about me telling you how many institutions there should be', 
that was the day I decided it was time to leave (Interview, August 2013). 
Institutional realignments 
In 2002, when the first National Water Resources Strategy (NWRS) was developed, the focus was on 
developing 19 CMAs, but over time it was realised how complex the process was, resulting in a mere 
two CMAs being established in 2004 and 2005. This led to a process of soul searching, and a review of 
the institutional landscape. 
The review revealed that there simply were too many entities reporting to the Minister. There were 279 
irrigation boards, water boards, CMAs, etc. and their roles and responsibilities were overlapping and not 
clear. There was also the question of financial viability. This is when we decided to focus on consolidation – 
it is also easier when both administrative and hydrological boundaries are somewhat aligned. Change has 
also happened too slowly. The irrigation boards are still the stronghold of white farmers and the water 
reform process is rolling out so slowly, so change is not happening (Interview at DWA, July 2013). 
Another aspect that led to a re-examination of current set-ups was the presence of participation 
fatigue. The long establishment process has eroded the social capital gains and undermined the trust of 
the stakeholders involved in the participatory processes to form the CMA. 
In South Africa water management is done with 'public participation'; even the pricing strategy is done by 
consulting NGOs, communities, Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM), etc. But nobody thinks of whether 
people have the capacity to participate and what the implications of all this participation are. We also 
underestimated the time, money and effort required for public participation. We overdid it and tried to get 
everybody on board. You can’t consult everybody. This is why institutional alignment will be better 
(Interview with DWA, July 2013). 
In assessing the overall viability and capacity of the 19 WMAs, the minister announced in March of 2012 
that in order to improve IWRM, the 19 WMAs must be consolidated into nine WMAs. The Inkomati 
                                                          
10
 Interview with task team member, 23 August 2013. 
11
 Interview with WRC employees, 16 July 2013. 
12
 Interview with DWA employee, 17 June 2013. 
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Water Management Area (IWMA) must merge with Mhlatuze-Usuthu WMA to form the Inkomati-
Usuthu WMA. As stated by a water expert in Pretoria: 
We started with so many naïve visions of what the CMAs would have done. We need to be more pragmatic 
now regarding decentralisation and what is possible. In hindsight, maybe it is positive that we tripped and 
fell with IWRM. We can now be more realistic of what is possible. We also need an incubation process and 
soul searching exercise to really bring people together to figure out what is actually possible (Interview, 
July 2013). 
So it was back to the drawing board, with a deep sense of pragmatism. This pragmatism is coloured by 
an increasing disillusionment with IWRM among other members of staff at the WRC. 
DISCUSSION 
The previous sections have highlighted how IWRM emerged and how it has been interpreted in diverse 
ways in South Africa. The South African situation is unique and differs from many other countries in the 
region in two major ways. The long reign of colonialism and apartheid meant that the majority of the 
population were squeezed into small marginal portions of the vast country, which had long-term 
implications for the productive potential of these areas. The 'hydraulic mission' meant that the water 
resources were highly developed, and the water resources system is currently rapidly approaching the 
'closed' stage (Grey and Sadoff, 2006). 
So, how is one to understand the emergence of IWRM against this backdrop? One important 
dimension was the environmental concerns, which were also an aspect in the Commission Report of the 
1970s that contained many ideas that were similar in nature to those touted by modern-day IWRM 
advocates. When the time finally came around for opening up the country for democratic rule, the 
most pressing needs were certainly doing something about the backlog of water services, which was 
not least influenced by the human rights-background of the then Minister. The split that occurred at 
this time in terms of two separate Acts later became a focal point in the debates on what should be 
'integrated' in IWRM, because some viewed the strict separation of services and resources as going 
against the grain of the 'I' in IWRM. A further pressure exacerbating this debate is the fact that in the 
post-apartheid era there has been an increasing trend of migration towards the urban centres, and 
peri-urban and squatter settlements putting further pressures on an already overstretched 
infrastructure. 
When it came to the aspect of resources management, environmentalists and conservationists were 
still a force to be reckoned with. Hence, despite the emphasis on redressing past injustices and 
reallocating water, the concept of IWRM seemed ideally fit to serve the purpose of the environmental 
lobby.13 Water as a means for poverty eradication, though implicitly a goal, was not really well thought 
out – as a lawyer who was instrumental in the water law drafting process later admitted (personal 
communication to co-author van Koppen). 
South Africa’s past government’s early strong focus on water control meant large-scale movement 
of water between basins to meet the needs of the (white) mines, energy, urban centres and agricultural 
areas, which necessitated huge investments in infrastructure. The development of large-scale 
infrastructure projects, including the establishment of a supporting bureaucracy, has had significant 
implications for what IWRM would look like in the South African context, mainly in terms of how it has 
facilitated large-scale interbasin transfers. 
                                                          
13
  However, as pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, the requirements of the reserve have also hardly been met in the 
functional CMAs. 
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For instance, the presence of powerful irrigation boards, as a result of the long history of investing in 
the (white) agricultural sector through generous subsidies and infrastructure support schemes, meant 
that the attempts at creating a new set of tiered governance according to hydrological boundaries did 
not start from scratch. The lowest tier of Water Users Associations (WUAs), was envisioned by some as 
emerging out of the across-the-board conversion of the existing Irrigation Boards, and to make them 
more representative and inclusive in the process. That project was met with much resistance and 
dragging of feet on the part of the already established commercial farmers, and hence the speed at 
which Irrigation Boards were converted into the new, more democratic WUAs, was extremely low – 
also with a lot of window-dressing taking place when it in fact did happen (Faysse and Gumbo, 2004; 
Movik, 2012), adding another dimension to the debate on decentralisation. While there was clear 
direction early on that the ultimate intent was to follow through with the idea of the 'subsidiarity 
principle' in IWRM and delegate responsibility down to the 'lowest appropriate level', this was clearly 
fraught with difficulty in the South African context. One consequence was the fact that the DWA did not 
relinquish its powers to issue licences to the ICMA until 2015, which created confusion among many 
water users regarding who was actually in charge (Movik, 2010; IUCMA, 2015; also Denby et al., this 
issue). This reinforces the claim made by one of the experts tasked with setting up the CMAs, namely, 
that South Africa just wasn’t ready for that kind of decentralisation effort, as it was far too political, and 
would risk getting tied up in power struggles on the ground. However, at the time of finalising this 
article, it is clear that CMAs have more power now than in the past, including making final proposals on 
licence allocations for approval by the head office (Senior water policy consultant, personal 
communication). 
A further feature that sets South Africa apart from the other case studies in this Special Issue is the 
presence of the Water Research Commission (WRC), funded from levies on water use. Set up in 1971 
after a period of severe water shortages and expanding demand by an industrialising white economy 
that underscored the necessity of better knowledge, its main aim was to facilitate research and 
generate water knowledge and technologies. As mentioned, studies by the WRC supported the drafting 
of the National Water Act (1998). As a national knowledge hub, the WRC was also key in studying 
implementation projects along IWRM lines, and facilitating national and international debate on 
possible meanings of IWRM as relevant for the South African context. While the WRC and others were 
struggling to get to grips with what IWRM was and how it should be interpreted, certain donors set out 
to develop their own interpretations and operationalising of IWRM in selected localities of the country. 
Hence, there emerged a situation where there was a national stance on IWRM at the level of national 
policy documents (such as the National Water Resources Strategy), while the CMAs had their own 
Catchment Management Strategies alongside the diverse interpretations followed by donors. For 
instance, the Danida project took a more bottom-up view and stirred up debates on IWRM. Their 
efforts emphasised the participatory and poverty aspects of IWRM and the need to integrate land and 
water issues in a bottom-up way. These experiments thus serve to illustrate the myriad of ways in 
which integration can be understood, as reflected in the ongoing debates within the research 
community as well. What is interesting is the 'parallel lives' of diverse sets of IWRM interpretations. 
Institutional arrangements became a focal point around which many of the IWRM debates played 
out, both within the WRC and the wider water research community. A key issue that resurfaces is the 
ideal-typical notion of institutions and the naïveté that coloured much of the thinking in terms of 
institutions. The new institutional set-up was being rolled out on an existing set of institutional 
structures and power constellations, and not on a blank surface that could be moulded into some 
technical ideal way of governing resources. While the WRC was hard at work trying to come to terms 
with what IWRM was – taking ICM as the point of departure – a sense was crystallised that IWRM was 
first and foremost about getting the institutions for river basin management right. This focus on the 
river basin does not explicitly come through in any of the Dublin principles or the GWP definition, but it 
is still what many people think about when they think of IWRM. Strikingly, in many of the countries of 
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SADC, not just South Africa, there is an emphasis on the river basin aspect, but as in Germany and 
elsewhere it was hard to focus on ecological and hydrological boundaries (see Movik et al., this issue). 
Hence, the logic of revisiting the idea of nine CMAs to be partly aligned with hydrological boundaries 
and partly with the administrative units of DWA’s regional offices in each province. This brought to the 
fore the inherent tensions existing around devolving power to the regions, reflecting an intrinsic tension 
in the very idea of IWRM between a centralised 'holistic' approach and the desire to decentralised 
management at lower levels. The issue of the lack of actual decentralisation in the South African 
context was raised by one of the external experts, Hector Garduño, to which the Director General 
retorted "you don’t understand South Africa" (Interview, November 2013). More broadly, the 
institutional set-up brought out how beset by power struggles the issue was, and particularly the 
relative autonomy of the regional offices. This underscored the point of the GWP southern Africa officer 
in South Africa that even though they were based in Pretoria, they had no influence on South Africa’s 
policies. 
Rolling out the idea of setting up 19 CMAs proved to be a long-winded uphill struggle. One issue was 
simply due to capacity constraints while the government was trying to do everything at once (Schreiner 
and Hassan, 2011) but also because of unforeseen regional resistance, looming tensions of 
centralisation/decentralisation, and the stickiness of water allocation reform. 
We need to get the governance structure right which affects IWRM delivery on the ground. We also need 
stronger regulation processes – regulation is not enforced and unlawful water use is a big problem. We 
don’t have the capacity to deal with this. IWRM has helped us to enhance and address equity. 
Transformation takes time and cannot be done in ten years despite all the best intentions. We also spent a 
lot of time in time-consuming activities such as compulsory licensing, verification, and validation – to 
achieve equity we thought we needed to know who had what so that reallocation could take place. But 
perhaps we spent too much time and money tracking down small users instead of only going after the big 
guys. But you learn from experience. Initially you want to be perfect and register everybody. But looking 
back we don’t need to get to 80% – we could stop at about 60%. With this pragmatism in place, we should 
start again. I still believe in the future! (Interview, July 2013). 
However, the regions resisted the attempts of foisting upon them IWRM-based institutional novelties 
such as the CMAs. This resistance was not anticipated by the task team mandated to 'roll out' the 
CMAs, and led to a protracted and resource-intensive struggle to establish such hydrological-based 
institutions across the board, but with only two CMAs being operational 15 years after the 
promulgation of the act – largely thanks to regional champions. The main reason for delays now in 
establishing the other seven CMAs are human resource/staffing issues and delegation of powers i.e. 
licensing remains a contentious topic. Added to all this were the complexities of trying to coordinate 
the different institutional set-ups at the regional and local levels. The resulting messiness and 
intractability rendered the idea of practising IWRM a moving target, given all the urgent issues around 
redistribution of land and water and the entrenched power patterns in the region. 
CONCLUSION 
IWRM emerged on the global scene a little before South Africa emerged as a new rainbow nation, keen 
to liberate itself from the legacies of the past. Water was seen as one of the key areas of inequality and 
the resulting new legislation and constitutional processes were truly radical, progressive and ahead of 
the time. IWRM was integrated into these processes by South Africans and foreign experts who were 
keen to engage with 'best international practice'. In many ways South Africa was way ahead of its time, 
not just in water and sanitation services, but also in water management, e.g. through the concept of the 
Reserve. But some of the ideas developed to maturity in the 1998 National Water Act were already 
nascent in the Commission Report of the 1970s and thus the emergence of IWRM was not as novel and 
progressive as it might seem at first glance.  
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Our study has shown that IWRM in South Africa has been understood in different ways across scales 
and regions. The institutionalisation of arrangements based on IWRM principles, i.e. Catchment 
Management Agencies, engendered a level of institutional complexity at the regional and local levels 
that did not manage to break down the 'silos', particularly of land and water (cf. Denby et al., this 
issue). The level of ambition and the amount of time and resources spent led to a profound sense of 
reform fatigue and left many historically disadvantaged individuals feeling even more excluded and 
angry. A particularly poignant point is that the implementation process did not fully appreciate the 
historical legacies and skewedness of land and water access. Thus the rather 'ideal-typical' institutional 
arrangements layered over the deeply embedded geographies of inequality and power imbalances and 
the infrastructures of the hydraulic mission project that characterised much of the apartheid era. The 
failure to properly integrate the land and water reforms further reinforced the disconnect between the 
socio-geographical landscapes and the attempts at setting up river basin institutions and implementing 
IWRM (see Denby et al., this issue). The CMAs were not given full powers, but were kept reined in by 
the national department, largely to avoid these institutions being captured by the most powerful 
players at the basin level. The existing water boards are also quite powerful organisations, and there 
was a concern that the newly created CMAs should not become such 'monsters'. Thus, the aim of 
decentralisation was not really carried through, and there is a constant centralisation-decentralisation 
tension present in the water sector. There were also different understandings of what should be the 
focal point and modus operandi of IWRM implementation. Some saw it as a natural evolution of the 
ICM approach, whereas others took the participatory and poverty dimension to mean that people 
should be empowered through adopting a livelihoods-focused, bottom-up approach. 
Our study suggests that the main emphasis was the focus on the need to get the institutional 
structures right. This was characterised, as many of our interviewees described, by a sense of naïve 
optimism in terms of what could be achieved. There was a certain degree of hubris involved in the 
planning to prepare for the establishment of 19 new institutions that did not conform to the existing 
administrative boundaries, but that would be created according to a logic of hydrology as the natural 
boundary. What the implementers had not foreseen was the resistance on the part of the regions, the 
protracted power struggles, and the smouldering tensions with respect to how authority should be 
parcelled out between the national department and the new basin-level organisations. In short, they 
didn’t factor in the political contestations that would follow in the wake of this endeavour. The process 
became a costly, bureaucratic exercise, leaving those involved with a profound sense of disillusionment. 
Many early champions have left the government in favour of joining the private consultancy sector, 
characterised by some as a veritable 'brain drain'. But some of these consultants still continue to dip in 
and out of the ongoing processes and are considered as colleagues by some of their counterparts in the 
government. 
Moreover, the efforts failed to engage with the ongoing processes of land reform and also the even 
more protracted process of reallocating water to redress past injustices, and the lack of coordination 
between land and water reform processes (see Denby et al., this issue). This was further underscored 
by the regional and local institutional hierarchies that failed to coordinate their activities adequately. 
But IWRM is not totally irrelevant as Biswas may say. Also, it is not a donor-driven externally 
imposed process in South Africa unlike in other African countries. It has believers who feel that it is an 
'approach' not a 'blueprint' that can guide and help, even if it is not implementable or workable in 
practice. This is despite the lack of evidence that it has helped enhance access and despite the fact that 
in reality local people may have been at best untouched and at worst badly affected by all the costly 
and bureaucratic institutional reform processes. Radical reform and reallocation processes have not 
taken place despite all the good intentions and structural inequalities that still persist. 
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Still, most of the people we interviewed14 continue to have hope and are keen to learn from the 
experiences of the past decade. They are less idealistic and more pragmatic of what is possible but still 
look to their progressive constitution and policies and hope for more equitable water futures in South 
Africa. 
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